Repetitive acquisitions involve benefits and costs. Benefits accrue from learning about the takeover process while costs involve integrating the combined firms. These benefits and costs are not directly observable from outside the firm but this paper proposes a simple model to infer their relative importance from the time between successive deals. The data requirements are minimal and allow the use of all mergers and acquisitions during 1992-2009 (more than 300,000 deals). The results provide strong and robust evidence that learning dominates integration costs for repetitive acquirers.
Athletes know that repetition is an essential ingredient of training, but too much repetition can cause damage. Repetitive acquirers face the same sort of trade-off: by repetitively undertaking acquisitions, acquirers may learn, 1 garnering expertise and other knowledge about the takeover process, but successive acquisitions increases firm size and diversity and thus generates integration costs. Do the gains from learning-by-doing dominate the integration costs for repetitive acquirers?
Learning and integration costs in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market possibly represent sizeable economic effects. The M&A market is a prime resource allocation channel;
as Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) report, the average annual aggregated deal value by U.S. acquirers during 1992-2009 was $928 billion, with a peak value in 1998 of $1,806 billion, or 13% of U.S. stock market capitalization.
Academics have long been aware of repetitive acquirers in the M&A market (e.g., Schipper and Thompson (1983) ). Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) provide stylized facts about the value creation effects of repetitive acquisitions using a sample of 3,135 deals announced during 1990-2000: buying public firms generate significant negative returns, but buying private targets and subsidiaries generate positive ones. These latter positive returns are even stronger when the deals are financed with equity.
Yet we know little about potential learning associated with repetitive acquisitions. Empirical evidence reported by Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) is discouraging:
acquirers that completed at least five deals during a three-year period earn 1.7% cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on average, but from the fifth deal onward, they earn only a 0.52% average CAR.
This decline in average CAR during acquisitions programs may indicate growing overconfidence (or related behavioral biases). Billet and Qian (2008) , for example, report a negative CAR for deals subsequent to the first among a sample of 3,537 public acquisitions during [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] and conclude that their results are consistent with a managerial selfattribution bias, leading to overconfidence. However, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2009) argue that the declining CAR during acquisitions programs is not incompatible with learning, because learning-by-doing might lead acquirers to assess expected synergies with the next target more accurately and thus to bid more aggressively to acquire it. Such learning could increase the probability of completing transactions, though at the cost of sharing a higher fraction of the value creation with target shareholders. Consequently, a declining CAR trend is not a conclusive proof of growing overconfidence. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2011) provide empirical evidence consistent with theoretical predictions associated with learning.
All this empirical evidence about repetitive acquirers relies on relatively small samples of large M&A transactions (typically, a few thousand transactions by U.S. public acquirers). A notable exception is Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) , who assess the effect of data screens on the scope and characteristics of M&A activity. 3 These authors show in particular that some commonly known results in M&A literature (e.g., acquirers' shareholders do not gain from acquisitions) do not generalize to larger samples. With respect to the question of potential learning associated with repetitive acquisitions, we suspect that such sample biases are relevant. For example, Hayward (2002) suggests that learning depends on the time between successive transactions, such that short periods between successive acquisitions do not allow learning processes to take place, but acquisitions that are too distant in time hamper organizational learning by allowing organizational memory losses.
If one limits attention to a subsample of large transactions undertaken by serial acquirers, the time between successive transactions cannot be estimated properly, because smaller intermediate transactions are dropped from the sample. The resulting measurement error may bias inferences about learning by repetitive acquirers. Moreover, large deals are significantly more value destroying (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) ) and integration costs relate (at least intuitively) to deal size, so one should expect that subsamples of large transactions are not entirely representative.
We therefore undertake the first, to the best of our knowledge, very large-scale study of learning gains in M&A markets. Our goal is to test whether learning dominates integration costs, or vice versa. If learning dominates integration costs for firms that implement acquisitions programs, structuring learning processes within the organization could be a key driver of value creation. On the contrary, if integration costs overcome learning, strict governance mechanisms to control acquisitions programs are needed -especially if CEO remuneration entails M&A bonuses (see Grinstein and Hribar (2004) ).
But investigating the relation between learning and integration costs is challenging, because neither element is directly observable from outside the firm; they are latent factors for the econometrician. We overcome this problem with a structural model that relates the time between successive deals (TBD) to the ratio of learning benefits to integrations costs. The TBD involves minimal data (i.e., one needs to know only the acquirer's identity and the announcement date or the completion date of the deal). In our model, the acquirer chooses the TBD (the time before undertaking a new transaction) that maximizes its expected profit, which is a function of the trade-off between learning benefits and integration costs. We characterize the learning and integration cost functions by a set of assumptions that reflect existing results and economic intuition -in particular, Hayward's (2002) results regarding the optimal time between successive transactions with respect to the learning processes. That is, experience provides positive learning when the time between successive transactions is short, but organizational amnesia generates negative learning effects when it is too long. Using the implicit function theorem, we express the partial derivative of the TBD with respect to the deal order number (DON) as a function of the relative importance of learning benefits and integration costs. We show that as long as learning is increasing in the TBD (experience effects), the TBD and the DON correlates negatively. This result is central to our method, because it allows us to infer, from an analysis of the relation between the TBD and the DON, the relative importance of changes in learning with respect to changes in integration costs.
Our main empirical evidence is drawn from a sample of 321,610 deals spanning the period 1992-2009, which are extracted from the Thomson-Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) database. This very large sample parallels that used by Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) and is designed to reveal M&A market activity as a whole. We impose no restrictions with respect to deal size (known or unknown), acquirer/target status (public or private), acquirer/target nationality (U.S. or non-U.S.), or deal type (merger, acquisition, partial acquisition, etc.). Our results are therefore not likely to be affected by endogenous sample selection. We complement the main analysis using a subsample of transactions with a richer set of information.
Our main measure of the TBD is the number of days between the most recent completed deal and the announcement date of the current deal, as reported in the SDC database. Learning and integration costs mostly materialize when transactions are completed.
We compute the DON by recomposing, for each acquirer, the history of its M&A activity.
The TBD is likely affected by industry-wide factors, unrelated to the trade-off between learning and integration costs, as suggested by the well-documented existence of M&A waves (see Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Harford, (2005) ). We control for this source of interference by computing an abnormal TBD using two methods. First, we take the difference between the TBD and the median TBD in the same industry/year. Second, we regress the TBD on a set of industry and market-wide potential determinants, then use the estimated residuals of this regression as a second measure of abnormal TBD. Most of our results are based on the industry median-adjusted abnormal TBD, but we obtain consistent results using the regression-based approach. Finally, we study the relation between the abnormal TBD and the DON using a linear fixed-effect panel regression model to control for the correlation between successive transactions undertaken by an acquirer.
Our results provide strong and robust evidence that the increase in learning dominates the increase in integration costs for repetitive acquirers. First, for the main sample of 38,887 unique firms that have completed at least two deals during 1992-2009, the abnormal TBD is significantly and negatively correlated with the DON. This result holds whether we use the industry median-adjusted abnormal TBD or the regression-adjusted abnormal TBD. We then split our sample into a short TBD subsample (i.e., observations for which the TBD is less than the sample median TBD) and its complement, a long TBD subsample. The negative correlation between the abnormal TBD and the DON is driven by the short TBD subsample (experience effect), which provided a clear indication that increases in learning dominate variations of integration costs during acquisition sequences. For the long TBD subsample, the results indicate that the memory loss effect is weaker than the decrease in integration costs as the time between successive deals increases.
Second, focusing on a subsample of 8,387 firms (17,655 observations) that undertook transactions classified as M&As by the SDC, we reach the same conclusion. The negative correlation between the abnormal TBD and the DON therefore is not driven by the presence of acquisitions of majority interests, assets, partial interests, or remaining interests in our main sample.
Third, the presence of several acquisitions by a firm over a period as long as [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] does not necessarily mean that the firm implemented an acquisitions program, defined as a succession of related acquisitions (Schipper and Thompson (1983) acquisitions essentially constitute portfolios of assets to sell back later. In the absence of postacquisition integration, we can safely postulate no integration costs. Moreover, if learning materializes, it can only be during the pre-acquisition part of the process (i.e., target identification, negotiation, offer specification), no specific activities taking places after. So by analyzing unrelated acquisitions by financial holdings, we can test whether learning is significant during the pre-acquisition phase. Our results are consistent with the notion that such pre-acquisition phase learning exists for short TBD transactions (experience effect).
Fifth, by design, we do not take into account the amounts invested into acquisitions, because our goal is to study the whole M&A market and impose minimal data requirements.
Yet we expect that deal size may relate to learning (i.e., acquirers may learn by undertaking small deals; Harding and Rovit (2004) ) and integration costs (i.e., large acquisitions require more resources to merge with existing activities), so its omission from our analyses may raise an issue of a correlated missing factor. To investigate this issue, we replicate our analyses using the cumulative deal size of previous transactions, in place of the DON variable, which captures both the number of deals already undertaken (similar to the DON) and the size of these previous transactions. We obtain a statistically significant negative correlation between the abnormal TBD and the cumulative deal size. The negative correlation between the TBD and the DON is therefore robust to the inclusion of the importance of financial resources invested in an M&A.
These results not only generalizes limited existing empirical evidence about learning but also focuses on the TBD, an attribute of acquisition sequences that previously has gone unexplored in finance literature. We provide also several robustness checks of our results with respect to our methodological and econometric choices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces a simple structural model of the trade-off between learning and integration costs. Section II is devoted to the empirical analysis. Section III provides additional results and robustness checks. Section IV concludes.
I. Learning and Integration Costs in Acquisition Sequences

A. Model Setup
Our goal is to study the trade-off between learning and integration costs faced by a firm undertaking an acquisition. The decision variable is the time the firm waits before making in a new acquisition attempt (TBD). We use the deal order number (DON) to proxy for the history of transactions already completed by the firm. Note that the DON in itself is not a decision variable; rather, it encapsulates past decisions. To keep the model as simple as possible, we abstract from information asymmetry issues and agency conflicts (e.g., among the CEO, shareholders, and/or creditors). We assume that firm decisions are made by the CEO, in the best interest of shareholders and with no budget constraints. The firm shareholders are risk neutral, so the CEO maximizes the firm's expected profit. We finally assume that the timing decision (TBD) affects acquisition profit only through the influence of learning and integration costs. Synergies and other sources of value creation are essentially a function of the target selection or the assets under consideration.
B. Learning and Integration Costs
Learning might bear on multiple dimensions of the takeover process (Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland (2001)), including the selection and valuation of targets, due diligence, negotiation, offer specification (e.g., premium, mode of payment), and management of regulatory issues 
0.
The substantial integration costs faced by acquiring firms also play an important role in merger success or failure. These costs are associated with reconciling various business activities; melting administrative, accounting, controlling, and information systems; and managing corporate culture differences.
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[ Figure 1 About Here]
We assume that total integration costs for a given deal attempt i, denoted C i , are a decreasing function of the TBD (see Figure 1 , Panel B): the more time elapses between two successive deals, the fewer resources used to integrate new activities are saturated, and the lower is the cost of integrating new activities. The first-order derivative of C i with respect to the TBD therefore has the following sign:
With respect to the firm's acquisition history, the form of the learning gains function depends on whether the TBD is short or long:
-Short TBD (experience effect): for a given short TBD, we assume that L i is an increasing function of DON (see Figure 1 , Panel A); i.e., expertise grows with experience:
-Long TBD (memory loss effect): for a given level of long TBD, we assume that L i is a decreasing function of DON (see Figure 1 , Panel A), so the memory loss effect adds up over the number of deals:
We finally assume that C i is an increasing function of DON (see Figure 1 , Panel B), such that the more deals already completed by the firm, the fewer resources it has available to manage the integration process of new activities, such that the integration process is more expensive:
Equations (1) to (5) describe a set of intuitive general assumptions, in the sense that we do not specify a precise functional form for learning gains and integration costs but limit restrictions to the sign of their first-(and second-order in the case of L i ) derivatives. These assumptions rest on previously reported results (Hayward (2002) ) or general economic principles (i.e., marginally decreasing profit functions and marginally increasing resource saturation).
C. The Acquirer's Decision Problem
The firm's decision problem is to choose when to undertake the next acquisition, that is, the time between the previous deal and the next deal attempt (TBD). 5 Given the characteristics of the selected target, the firm's expected rate of return is:
where Pr is the probability of acquiring the target, are the acquisition expected synergies and other sources of value creation, is the acquisition size and is the firm cost of capital. The more the firm waits for its next acquisition, the higher is the risk of losing the acquisition opportunity ( P 0). To simplify the analysis, we assume unit investment ( 1 and no costs related to losing the acquisition opportunity.
In the absence of (invertible) functional specifications of learning and integration costs, no explicit expression of the optimal TBD can be derived. Our strategy is therefore to develop predictions about the relation between the TBD and the DON, which are observable, using the implicit function theorem. The derivative of the TBD with respect to the DON can be expressed as follows: .
We note that:
Pr ;
In equilibrium, , , 1 : the firm achieves its required rate of return. These results lead us to the expression that relates the derivative of the TBD with respect to the DON to the partial derivatives of learning gains and integration costs:
. (8) Equation (8) in turn allows us to derive empirical testable predictions, because TBD and DON are observable.
D. Empirical Predictions
Learning gains are increasing for short TBD (experience effect) and decreasing for long TBD (memory loss effect). Our empirical predictions depend on the sign of .
D.1. Short TBD: Experience Effect
When is strictly positive, the denominator of Equation (8) is strictly positive.
Therefore, the sign of depends on the sign of :
-: the increase in learning gains through the acquisition sequence dominates the increase in integration costs. Then, is negative, and the time that elapses between successive deals should decrease during the sequence.
-: integration costs increase at a higher pace than learning gains, and is positive, so TBD should be increasing during the acquisition sequence.
For short TBD, the sign of allows us to infer whether the increase in learning gains dominates the increase in integration costs during the acquisition sequence, or vice versa.
D.2. Long TBD: Memory Loss Effect
When is strictly negative, the numerator of Equation (8) is always negative (indeed, 0: memory loss effects add up with greater integration costs). The sign of Equation (8) depends this time on the sign of the denominator:
-: the memory loss effect dominates the decrease in integration costs. The denominator of Equation (8) is negative, and the sign of is negative. The time between successive acquisitions should decrease through the deal sequence, because the memory loss effect is prevalent.
-: the decrease in integration costs dominates the memory loss effect. The denominator of Equation (8) is positive, and the sign of is positive.
For long TBD, we can infer from the sign of whether the memory loss effect dominates the decrease in integration costs during acquisition sequences, or vice versa.
We thus summarize our empirical predictions in Proposition 1. We are mainly interested in testing prediction (a) for the short TBD, which allows us to infer from the relation between the TBD and DON the relative importance of learning and integrations costs during sequences characterized as short TBD. In the theoretical analysis,
short TBD corresponds to the TBD region in which L i is increasing (left part of Figure 1 ) and long TBD, the region in which L i is decreasing (right part of Figure 1 ). In the empirical analysis, we use the sample median TBD as a cut-off point to identify short versus long TBD at the firm level.
II. Empirical Evidence
A. Sample
The to overlook such transactions. However, to limit the analysis to acquisitions with an explicit change of control, we retain them only when the acquirer purchases 50% or more of the target's shares and owns less than 50% of the target six months prior to the deal announcement.
No restrictions are imposed with respect to deal size (whether or not SDC reports the deal value), to the status of acquirers and targets (public or private), or to the nationality of acquirers and targets (U.S. or non-U.S.). The earliest sample year is 1992 when SDC begin covering deals of any value, even those with unkown values. This restriction is particularly relevant for our goal of building a complete acquisition history of every firm and minimizing the risk of missing a transaction.
After removing 1,394 duplicate observations, identified by their announcement date, acquirer, and target CUSIP, we retain 321,610 transactions (the main sample). Table I contains summary statistics of the annual acquisition activity by all acquirers and by U.S.
acquirers. For both groups of acquirers, the sample exhibits a first peak in the number of transactions between 1997 and 2000, consistent with the well-documented "friendly" M&A wave of the end of the 1990s (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) similarly have highlighted the presence of serial acquirers. The average deal size by DON in Table II is clearly increasing through the acquisition sequence. For example, the fifth deal in a sequence has an average (median) deal size three (two) times higher than the first deal, and the tenth deal has an average (median)
deal size approximately four (three) times higher than the first deal. After the fifteenth deal, the average deal size seems not to increase much more, with an average deal size five times higher than the first. This substantial increase of the deal size throughout the acquisition sequence appears consistent with learning. That is, firms would begin with smaller deals to learn the basics, then as they gain more knowledge, they would risk bigger acquisitions (as indicated in management literature; Harding and Rovit (2004) ). But another interpretation is that deal size is correlated with acquirer size and that larger acquirers do more deals. The apparent positive correlation between DON and the deal size would then be driven by the acquirer size (a latent factor here). The last two columns of Table II (average and median acquirer market value in millions of dollars) are consistent with this second interpretation.
[ Table II About Here]
B.2. Time Between Deals (TBD)
Potentially, learning starts as soon as an acquisition is attempted, whether or not it is completed, because target identification, the choice of buying procedure, the offer specification, etc., can be as informative as the post-acquisition activities. But integration costs arise only after the acquisition is completed. Thus, the choice of whether to compute the TBD as the difference between the announcement date of the current transaction and the completion date of the most recently completed transaction or as the difference between announcement dates of successive transactions is an important issue (see Figure 2 ). We use mostly the TBD defined as the days between the announcement date of the current transaction and the completion date of the preceding transaction, which we denote TBDC. The TBDC spans a conservative interval of learning, because it does not include the earliest part of the potential learning period. We provide also results using the days between the announcement dates of the current deal and the previous deal (denoted TBDA) as a robustness check.
[ Figure 2 About Here]
M&As exhibit waves at the aggregate and industry levels (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) ;
Harford (2005)), which should materially influence the TBD . However, our model postulates a trade-off between learning gains and integration costs at the firm level. It is firm specific, so we must control for industry and aggregate influences on the TBD in empirical tests.
Accordingly, we compute the abnormal TBD as the difference between the TBD and median TBD of deals in the same industry/year as the deal under consideration,
where d is the current deal, and I is the set of deals in the same industry/year. We use the three-digit SIC code to define the industry. (In our robustness checks, we assess the stability of the results using the two-digit SIC code, and we complement this median-adjusted abnormal TBD approach with a regression-based approach.) Table III lists the summary statistics for the TBD variables for the entire sample as well as the short and long TBD subsamples. Because the predictions in the previous section depend on the presence of a short or long TBD, the sample is divided according to TBD length, around the median.
[ It is tempting to interpret the trends in the TBDC, TBDA, and abnormal TBDC in light of Proposition 1, but successive transactions by a given acquirer are not independent observations. Statistical inference therefore could be difficult, a concern we address in Section II.C.
B.3. Control Variables
Some of our analyses require the use of additional control variables. We collect several transaction-level control variables: a dummy variable identifying horizontal deals (at the fourdigit SIC industry level), a dummy variable identifying private targets, a dummy variable identifying U.S. targets, and deal size in millions of dollars. Panel A of Table IV provides the number of observations in our main sample for which these variables are available, the fraction of horizontal transactions, the fractions of private targets and domestic targets, and the average and median deal sizes. Panels B and C contain the corresponding figures for the short and long TBD subsamples, respectively. Although the three dummy variables are available for all transactions, the SDC reports deal size for less than half of them (see also Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) ). The percentage of horizontal transactions appears slightly higher for the long TBD subsample, whereas domestic targets seem slightly more present in the short TBD subsample. The percentage of private targets is stable between the two subsamples. The average deal size is substantially higher for short TBD transactions (a difference of almost $40 million), but this difference likely driven by a few large transactions, because the median deal sizes are comparable.
[ Table IV About Here]
B.4. Econometric Specifications
Successive transactions by a given acquirer are not necessarily independent observations. We therefore control for the possible correlation of successive acquisitions by a given firm.
Our baseline approach is to adopt a fixed-effect panel data specification:
where i is the acquisition index, j is the firm index, and is the firm-fixed effect that captures unobservable factors that remain constant through time. The section on robustness checks reports additional results using a pooled estimator and clustered standard errors (Petersen (2009); Thompson (2011) ).
C. Results
Our main results, the estimation of Equation (10), are reported in Table V . The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted abnormal TBDC. The first column in Panel A of Table V summarizes the main sample results for 129,400 observations, a significant reduction in sample size relative to the 321,610 transactions identified in Table I . But we need at least two transactions to compute the TBD, and 179,057 transactions are for the first deal (see Table II ).
The 129,400 observations involve 38,887 unique acquirers, for an average of 3.3 observations per acquirer. Fixed-effect coefficients are therefore not included in Table V (there are 38,887). The Fisher statistic is highly significant, with a value of 109.08. The estimated coefficient of the DON variable is -2.08, and the corresponding t-statistic is highly significant with a value of -10.44. The abnormal TBDC decreases on average throughout the acquisition sequences.
[ Table V About Here] Proposition 1, on the relation between the TBD and the DON, depends on whether the context is the experience effect part of the learning function (short TBD) or the memory loss effect part (long TBD), which are reported separately after splitting the sample at the median in columns 2 and 3. For the short TBD in column 2, the DON coefficient is -1.36 and highly significant with a t-statistic of -22.93. This is a clear indication that learning in acquisition sequences dominates increase in integration costs. In contrast, for the long TBD subsample in column 3, DON has a positive coefficient (0.90) that is also significant (t-stat = 2.27).
The contrast in the DON coefficients between columns 2 and 3 is striking. It indicates that for long TBD, the decrease in integration costs obtained by waiting longer before undertaking a next deal dominates the adverse effect due to memory loss.
The results in column 2 and 3 refer to subsamples formed by selecting observations on the dependent variable (TBDC). This procedure might raise concerns about endogenous subsampling, but our aim is not to generalize these results to the whole population of transactions (which are in column 1). Rather, columns 2 and 3 offer direct tests of Proposition 1. We note finally that the results for the full sample seem driven mainly by the short TBDC subsample: in both cases, the DON coefficient is negative and highly significant, whereas for the long TBDC subsample, the DON coefficient is positive.
These results pertain to a long period of time (1992 to 2009), and it is possible that acquirers undertaking a few transactions (e.g., 2 or 3) over a 18-year period are not really implementing acquisitions programs (Schipper and Thompson (1983) ). Therefore, to refine our analysis, Panel B of Table V reports results for a subsample of acquisitions sequences that clearly reflect acquisitions programs, according to two criteria. First, the acquirer must remain quiet for 24 months (no acquisition attempts in our main sample), similar to Song and Walkling's (forthcoming) dormant period (though they use a period of 12 months). This makes it likely that we capture the starts of new acquisitions programs. Second, the maximum time elapsed between two successive transactions is 6 months and thus includes only sequences of related transactions. With respect to our main sample, in which the median TBD is 174 days (see Panel A, Table III) , we select only sequences of short TBD transactions. In comparison, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) demand that "the acquirer completes bids for five or more targets in any three-year window during the sample period" (p. 1771), which implies a six-month maximum average time between transactions for the window of three years. Their criterion is thus somewhat less strict than ours, because we apply the six-month threshold on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
The results in Panel B of Table V confirm our initial evidence: the DON coefficient is negative (-25.68) and highly significant (t-stat = -22.16). The coefficient's value (in absolute terms) is more than 10 times higher than the coefficients reported in Panel A of Table V for the total sample (column 1) and the short TBD subsample (column 2), and the associated tstatistic is as high for the short TBD subsample (column 2), despite the drastic reduction in the sample size. The increase in learning through acquisition sequences thus seems to be particularly pronounced. Perhaps acquirers starting an acquisitions program focus more on putting learning processes into place throughout their organization.
Does learning occur during the pre-acquisition phase? To seek an answer to this question, we study a subsample of unrelated acquisitions by financial holdings, which likely engage in buying and reselling in the general course of their business. It seems less likely that financial holdings bother much to integrate unrelated acquisitions. Without post-acquisition integration costs, learning can occur, if at all, during the pre-acquisition phase.
We therefore form another subsample applying two criteria to our main sample. First, acquirers are firms from SIC code 671, "Offices and Bank Holding Companies." Second, the transactions involve targets outside the financial industy (SIC codes 6000-6999). Given these constraints, we can identify a sample of 363 deals, undertaken by 192 financial holdings acquirers, for which we can compute the TBD (see column 1, Panel C, Table V ). The DON coefficient for this sample (column 1, Panel A, Table V) is not significant, but when the 363 observations are divided into two subsamples using the median abnormal TBD, the DON coefficient is negative (-11.08) and marginally significant (t-stat = -1.64) for the short TBD subsample (column 2). This result should not be dismissed just because the sample is small and the fixed-effect panel approach requires that we estimate numerous coefficients (118 fixed-effect coefficients, slope, and variance of the residuals). Despite the low statistical power of this test, there is significant evidence of learning during the pre-acquisition phase by financial holdings.
III. Robustness Checks
This section checks the robustness of our results with respect to various potential issues, including the computation of the TBD, the sample composition, the stability and form of the learning function, and the correlation between successive observations for a given acquirer.
For brevity, results are given only for the main sample (i.e., the sample discussed in column 1, Panel A, Table V ).
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A. TBD Computation
The results in Table V are based on the TBDC, the number of days between the current transaction announcement date and the completion date of the most recent transaction (see Figure 2 ). An alternative computation would use the number of days between successive announcement dates (TBDA). The first column of Table VI provides the results when TBDA is the dependent variable. The DON coefficient is negative (-2.00) and very close to the value reported in Panel A of Table V (column 1), as well as highly significant (t-stat = -9.97).
Hence, defining the time elapsed between two successive deals, commencing with the announcement date or the completion date of the previous deal, does not affect the results.
[ Table VI About Here] 9 The full set of results are available on request.
The range of the TBDC is large (from 1 to 6,430 days in the main sample). We check whether the results are affected by using the natural logarithm of the TBDC before computing the abnormal TBDC. The second column of Table VI displays the results. The DON coefficient is again negative (-0.02) and highly significant (t-stat = -29.40). Using the log(TBDC) increases the statistical significance of the DON coefficient.
We also compute the industry median-adjusted TBDC using the three-digit rather than the two-digit SIC code. The results are in column 3 of Table VI . The DON coefficient and its associated t-statistic are almost unaffected by this change.
In column 4 of Table VI, we also assess the robustness of the results by computing the abnormal TBD using a regression-based approach. We start by regressing the TBDC on a set of industry-and market-wide determinants: HHI, industry concentration (i.e., the HerfindahlHirschman index for firms with a given three-digit SIC code, computed using firm total assets reported in the Compustat database); Median Firm Size, (estimated using firm market value from the CRSP database); Median ROA, or the industry median return on assets; Median Growth Rate, the industry median sales-based growth rate; Liquidity, the liquidity index introduced by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) to capture the intensity of corporate asset transactions within an industry; Aggregate Market-to-Book, or the aggregate market-tobook ratio; and C&I spread, the commercial and industrial loan rate spreads used by Harford (2005) .
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All these variables are measured as of year-end when the transaction was announced. The first-step regression is therefore:
where i is the acquisition index, j is the firm index, and Ind and Year are the corresponding industry and year indices, respectively.
The residuals of this first-step regression become our new measure of the abnormal TBDC:
where , is the fitted value from Equation (11).
The estimation results for Equation (11), in Panel A of Table VII Table V) . We therefore consider the results in Table V cautious estimates with respect to the procedure chosen to adjust the TBDC to industry-and market-wide determinants.
A last concern that might be raised about the computation of TBDC is the presence of a private portion in the M&A process, as recently emphasized by Boone and Mulherin (2007) .
The issue is potentially serious, because private negotiations between parties make the announcement date an imperfect measure of the transaction starting point. If this measurement error is correlated with our independent variable, we face a endogenous errors-in-variables problem. We check it using a sample of 1,573 transactions for which we collected the length of the private process by hand, using the SEC filings S4 and 14D for mergers and 14A for tender offers (see also Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) ). This sample of M&A transactions spanned 1994-2007 among U.S. listed firms, featured a minimum deal size of $100 million, and required that the percentage held by the acquirer was less than 50% before the deal announcement and more than 50% after its completion. The private process length is the time elapsed, in days, between the initiation of the takeover process and the announcement date of the takeover agreement. For these 1,573 transactions, we regress the private process length on the DON variable (computed using our main sample):
where i is the acquisition index, and j is the firm index.
Panel B of Table VII features the estimation results for Equation (13). The DON coefficient is negative (-0.15) but not statistically significant (t-stat = -0.43). We thus conclude that private process-generated errors in the TBD variable are mainly innocuous noise that might affect test power but do not influence our inferences.
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B. Sample Composition
The main sample includes transactions classified by SDC as acquisitions of assets, majority of interest, certain assets, remaining interests, and exchange offers, as well as those 11 It could be argued that the private part in the M&A process generates signed errors in the TBDC computation, because the announcement date by definition is the last day of the private period. Signed errors of measurement might be a source of an estimation bias, but this concern only holds for the TBDC variable. For the TBDA variable, the errors of measurement may be positive or negative. Column 1 of Table V) , and strongly significant (t-stat = -4.86). Adding the control variables in column 2 reduces the sample to 12,769 observations (column 2) but increases both the DON coefficient estimate (-17.52) and its statistical significance (t-stat = -14.81).
For the sake of brevity, the coefficients of the control variables are not reported, because none of them is significant. Focusing on repetitive acquirers in column 3 generates a sample of 84,637 observations. Almost the same coefficient estimate is obtained for the DON variable (-2.07) as in the main sample, and it is again highly statistically significant with a t-statistic of -12.24. These results together confirm that the results presented thus far do not depend on sampling choices.
C. Learning Gains Function
In Section I, learning and integration costs functions are assumed to be stable throughout acquisitions sequences. But in practice, exogenous shocks can transform the shape of these functions. In particular, information technology has modified profoundly the way people communicate and collaborate in the past two decades. In 1992, the Internet was virtually absent in the business environment; today, it is ubiquitous. The information technology revolution also has created a massive disintermediation movement, affecting many industries (e.g., travel and leisure, computers and software, banking and insurance). These exogenous shocks might change the learning gains and information costs functions of acquirers.
To deal with this issue, we select, for each acquirer, transactions after the point at which DON = 5. This selection criterion yields 57,149 observations (column 1, Panel B, Table VIII ).
With this sample, the DON coefficient is negative (-0.78) and highly significant (t-stat = -5.16). However, the DON coefficient estimate is significantly smaller than the one obtained with the main sample (-2.08, column 1, Panel A, Table V) : the increase in learning continues to dominate the increase in integration costs even for later transactions undertaken by each acquirer. The change in the estimated slope is more difficult to interpret though. It may be due to the concave/convex form of learning and integration costs functions (see Figure 1 ) or to structural changes in the shape of these functions. The limited number of observations by acquirer does not allow one to disentangle these interpretations.
Another potential shortcoming of the model in Section I relates to financial resources committed to acquisitions. A key characteristic of M&A transactions is the deal size (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) ), which the theoretical analysis presented in Section I ignores.
Yet one may suspect relations among deal size, integration costs, and learning. In particular, integration costs should increase with deal size, and undertaking small acquisitions may be a good path to mastering the acquisition process (Harding and Rovit (2004) ). To check whether omitting the financial resources committed to acquisitions affects our results, the cumulative deal size through the acquisition sequence replaces the DON variable used in Equation (10):
where i is the acquisition index, j is the firm index, and Cumulative Deal Size i,j is the cumulative deal size from the first to the most recent transaction i -1 for acquirer j. If the deal size is not reported by SDC, the transaction is skipped, such that the real amount of financial resources committed is underestimated.
Column 2 in Panel B of Table VIII [ Table VIII About Here]
D. Correlation of Observations
Because successive transactions by an acquirer are not independent observations, a fixedeffect panel estimator is used to generate the results reported in Tables V, VI , and VIII. To check the robustness of the results against this choice, Panel C of Table VIII reports results obtained using the standard pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimator with asymptotic standard error (column 1) and clustered standard error (column 2), as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) .
The classic pooled OLS estimator yields a negative estimate for the DON coefficient (-8.92 ), confirming the results obtained with the fixed-effect panel estimator. The DON is highly significant, whether we rely on an asymptotic (t-stat = -59.84) or clustered (t-stat = -2.88) standard error. However, the impact of the correlation between successive observations for a given acquirer on the standard errors estimates is strong (i.e., the DON coefficient clustered standard error is more than 20 times greater than the asymptotic one).
Equation (10) Table V) . Interpretation of the DON coefficient estimate obtained using the pooled OLS estimator must be done with care though, because it is unclear whether the negative slope reflects a decrease in the abnormal TBDC for a given acquirer or indicates that acquirers that engage in more deals perform them faster.
[ Figure 3 About Here]
IV. Conclusions
Acquirers that undertake sequences of acquisitions may benefit by learning from deal to deal, but they also are potentially exposed to integration costs that become larger impediments with more deals. We study this trade-off. But because learning and integration costs are not observable from outside the firm, we model the acquirer's decision to undertake new transactions as a function of the time elapsed since its previous acquisition (TBD). The model's main result is a testable empirical prediction that relates TBD in acquisitions sequences to the relative importance of learning and integration costs.
Computing the TBD imposes minimal data requirements (i.e., only acquirer identity and announcement date). Thus, one can observe TBD for the all acquisitions in the entire M&A market during 1992-2009, more than 300,000 transactions. The empirical evidence uncovers a clear and significant decrease in the TBD during acquisitions sequences. This negative trend in the TBD is consistent with learning benefits that dominate integration costs.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the relative importance of learning and integration costs for a sample that is not potentially biased by selection criteria (see Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (forthcoming) ). Results show that for firms that engage into repetitive acquisitions, learning dominates integration costs . This has potentially important managerial implications. It reveals the importance of learning-by-doing through repetitive acquisitions and emphasizes the need to implement organizational structures designed to encourage and develop learning processes as much as possible. -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Num. Obs. Average abnormal TBDC Table I Acquisition Activity by Year Here are robustness checks with respect to measurement of the dependent variable. The table reports the estimated coefficient of the deal order number variable (DON) using a fixed-effect panel regression. The dependent variable changes across columns. The TBDA is the number of days between the announcement dates of the current deal and the previous deal. The TBDC is the number of days between the announcement date of the current deal and the completion date of the previous deal. "ln" is the logarithm operator. In columns 1 and 2, the abnormal TBDA and abnormal ln(TBDC) are industry adjusted using the three-digit SIC code industry median TBDA and ln(TBDC), respectively. In column 3, the abnormal TBDC is computed using the two-digit SIC code industry median TBDC. In column 4, the abnormal TBDC is computed using the regression-based approach described in Section III.A. In Panel A, the time between successive deals is regressed on a set of industry-and market-wide determinants. The dependent variable is the TBDC, the number of days between the announcement date of the current deal and the completion date of the previous deal. The explanatory variables are as follows: HHI, the sales-based industry concentration computed using firm total assets; Median Firm Size, the industry median firm size (estimated using the firm market value, obtained from the CRSP database); Median ROA, or the industry median return on assets; Median Growth Rate, the industry median sales-based growth rate; Liquidity, the liquidity index introduced by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) to capture the intensity of corporate asset transactions within an industry; Aggregate Market-to-Book, or the aggregate market-to-book ratio; and C&I Spread, the commercial and industrial loan rate spreads used by Harford (2005) . Industry variables are computed using the threedigit SIC code. In Panel B, the private process length is the number of days between the initiation of the takeover process and the announcement of the takeover agreement; it is regressed on the deal order number (DON). The details of the private takeover process are hand collected from the merger background section of SEC filings (see Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) 
